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ciroccojSo, my Background thingy is done, and I figured in case anybody out there had a true burning need to learn about what sparked two of the merriest orgies of civil rights violations in Canada, here's your chance. And hey, if anybody does take me up on that and foolishly clicks on the cut link below and notices some hideous danglypartciples, or mispellings, or logic/grammar oopsies, or OOC dialogue or whatever, drop me line, 'kay? This section is in black, which means it's almost ready to go, and I always re-read before actually printing, but it's always good to get outside feedback for stuff your own eyes get too tired to spot by the tenth re-read.
II. BACKGROUND: THE EVENTS
A. Pearl Harbor, December 6, 1941
In December of 1941, there were approximately 23,000 persons of Japanese origin or descent living in Canada. Most of them were Canadian citizens and 95% lived along the coast of British Columbia. Roughly two thirds worked in agriculture, manufacturing, general labour, or the service sector. 16% worked in the fishing industry.
On December 6, 1941, Japan invaded Pearl Harbor, resulting in enormous loss of life and property and prompting United States and Canada to declare war on Japan.
The shock of the attack, coming as it did before a formal declaration of war, was immediate and intense, as was the fear that a similar attack could happen in Canada. There was also widespread belief that the attack on Pearl Harbor had been a success because of Japanese informants living in Hawaii, who passed along vital information to the Japanese attackers. Many Canadians living on the west coast truly feared that persons of Japanese origin or descent would be more loyal to Japan than to Canada, and that their maritime location would make it easy for Japan to use them as agents against Canada. This fear was widespread and not confined to any one group or political persuasion. For example, The Fisherman, a Communist paper from British Columbia[FN – leftist response], stated on December 9, 1941, that:
More so than any other section of our people, the fishermen on this coast are aware of the difficulties created by the presence here of a large Japanese population, no inconsiderable part of which is engaged in the fishing industry. They will join with the rest of organized labor in condemning any violence against the Japanese here, a majority of whom are Canadian-born or naturalized Canadian citizens ... [b]ut, in the light of their own knowledge and experience, they will demand the taking of stringent precautions ... even though such precautionary measures work hardship upon Japanese loyal to our country.
... The Fisherman welcomes the announced intention of defense authorities to immobilize the Japanese fleet. For this reason, The Fisherman demands that all fishing licenses issued to Japanese be cancelled for the duration. It is equally important that all Japanese be removed from the vicinity of fortified areas ... [FN from Japanese Canadians and the political left]
The Fisherman's words were remarkably restrained, compared to the kinds of statements being made about the Japanese by others at the time. The Fisherman at least conceded that many members of the Japanese community could be considered "loyal to our country." Others were not as generous. Thomas Reid, the Liberal member of New Westminster, labelled the Japanese "an unassimilable race of people who cannot in the strict sense become true Canadians," and pushed the federal government to move them out of BC altogether. Organizations such as the Vancouver Board of Trade, citizens' groups, and the Sons of England Benefit Society, expressed a desire to not only evacuate the entire Japanese-Canadian community, but to deport them all back to Japan at the end of the war.
The intensity of the fear and hostility displayed towards the Japanese community were so intent that they were cause for concern for the authorities. The special Standing Committee on Orientals, for example, stated in its report in December that "all the witnesses it had called, whether they were or were not sympathetic toward the Japanese-Canadians, had agreed that the real danger as violence on the part of the white community."
In light of the fear of treason and sabotage and, to a lesser extent, out of concern for the safety of Japanese-Canadians, the government felt great pressure to show some kind of response.
B. FLQ Crisis, October 5-December 3, 1970: The Events and the Threat
In response to grievances against the rest of Canada, and in an effort to convince both Quebecois and Canadians to allow Quebec to separate, the Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ) carried out more than 200 crimes from 1963 to 1970, resulting in a great deal of damage and social disruption and six deaths.[FN] The largest such incident, the bombing of the Montreal Stock Exchange on February 13, 1969, resulted in enormous damage and injured 27 people. FLQ members also carried out thefts of explosives to use in their attacks and bank robberies to finance their operations. By 1970, there were 23 FLQ members in jail, four of them convicted of murder.[FN]
On October 5, 1970, the FLQ kidnapped British Trade Commissioner James Cross and sent the authorities a ransom letter with their demands in exchange for his release. The demands included ransom money, the release of many of the FLQ members who had been detained, and the CBC broadcast of the FLQ Manifesto. Although the government did not agree to any other demands, they did agree to allow the FLQ Manifesto to read over CBC/Radio-Canada Oct. 8, 1970. Some excerpts from the Manifesto:
The Front de Libération du Québec wants total independence for Quebeckers; it wants to see them united in a free society, a society purged for good of its gang of rapacious sharks...
The Front de Libération du Québec is not an aggressive movement, but a response to the aggression organized by high finance through its puppets, the federal and provincial governments...
... we wash our hands of the British parliamentary system ... In the coming year Bourassa is going to get what's coming to him: 100,000 revolutionary workers, armed and organized![FN Manifesto]
On October 10, Pierre Laporte, Minister of Labour and Vice-Premier of Quebec, was kidnapped by another cell of the FLQ. On October 15, FLQ representatives spoke to 1,500 students at the Université de Montréal. The majority of the students voiced support for the FLQ's demands, and organized a rally that night that brought 3,000 students from across Montreal to show their support for the FLQ. At the same time, ten prominent Quebecois public figures, including René Lévesque, leader of the Parti Québecois, Claude Ryan, Editor of Le Devoir, and labour leader Louis Laberge, claimed that it was "urgent that the FLQ demands be met in order that social and political liberty in Quebec can be guaranteed."[FLQ clip]
The Quebec authorities responded by formally requesting help from the federal government. Robert Bourassa, Premier of Quebec, expressed his fear that the crisis did not just involve the danger to the lives of the two men in captivity:
the Quebec Government is convinced that the law, as it stands now, is inadequate to meet this situation satisfactorily.
Under the circumstances, on behalf of the Government of Quebec, I request that emergency powers be provided as soon as possible so that more effective steps may be taken. I request particularly that such powers encompass the authority to apprehend and keep in custody individuals who, the Attorney General of Quebec has valid reasons to believe, are determined to overthrow the government through violence and illegal means ... we are facing a concerted effort to intimidate and overthrow the government and the democratic institutions of this province through planned and systematic illegal action, including insurrection. It is obvious that those participating in this concerted effort completely reject the principle of freedom under the rule of law.
His sentiments were echoed by M. St. Pierre, Director of the police of Montreal, who outlined the practical terms of what kinds of powers were needed, and why:
... the investigation which the police authorities must undertake must necessarily delve into all aspects of the activities of the networks of this seditious movement, and should not be restricted to simply searching for the individuals who perpetrated the odious kidnapping of the two people who are still prisoners - for this would mean failure.
The slowness of procedures and the restraints imposed by the legal methods and mechanisms now at our disposal do not allow us at this time to cope with the situation.
Consequently, I recommend that the executive committee of the city, request that the higher governments give us all the means they think appropriate and useful, so as to allow us to collect and present the proofs needed to protect society from the seditious and insurrectional manoeuvres unleashed by the kidnappings.[FN letters]
II. BACKGROUND: THE EVENTS
A. Pearl Harbor, December 6, 1941
In December of 1941, there were approximately 23,000 persons of Japanese origin or descent living in Canada. Most of them were Canadian citizens and 95% lived along the coast of British Columbia. Roughly two thirds worked in agriculture, manufacturing, general labour, or the service sector. 16% worked in the fishing industry.
On December 6, 1941, Japan invaded Pearl Harbor, resulting in enormous loss of life and property and prompting United States and Canada to declare war on Japan.
The shock of the attack, coming as it did before a formal declaration of war, was immediate and intense, as was the fear that a similar attack could happen in Canada. There was also widespread belief that the attack on Pearl Harbor had been a success because of Japanese informants living in Hawaii, who passed along vital information to the Japanese attackers. Many Canadians living on the west coast truly feared that persons of Japanese origin or descent would be more loyal to Japan than to Canada, and that their maritime location would make it easy for Japan to use them as agents against Canada. This fear was widespread and not confined to any one group or political persuasion. For example, The Fisherman, a Communist paper from British Columbia[FN – leftist response], stated on December 9, 1941, that:
More so than any other section of our people, the fishermen on this coast are aware of the difficulties created by the presence here of a large Japanese population, no inconsiderable part of which is engaged in the fishing industry. They will join with the rest of organized labor in condemning any violence against the Japanese here, a majority of whom are Canadian-born or naturalized Canadian citizens ... [b]ut, in the light of their own knowledge and experience, they will demand the taking of stringent precautions ... even though such precautionary measures work hardship upon Japanese loyal to our country.
... The Fisherman welcomes the announced intention of defense authorities to immobilize the Japanese fleet. For this reason, The Fisherman demands that all fishing licenses issued to Japanese be cancelled for the duration. It is equally important that all Japanese be removed from the vicinity of fortified areas ... [FN from Japanese Canadians and the political left]
The Fisherman's words were remarkably restrained, compared to the kinds of statements being made about the Japanese by others at the time. The Fisherman at least conceded that many members of the Japanese community could be considered "loyal to our country." Others were not as generous. Thomas Reid, the Liberal member of New Westminster, labelled the Japanese "an unassimilable race of people who cannot in the strict sense become true Canadians," and pushed the federal government to move them out of BC altogether. Organizations such as the Vancouver Board of Trade, citizens' groups, and the Sons of England Benefit Society, expressed a desire to not only evacuate the entire Japanese-Canadian community, but to deport them all back to Japan at the end of the war.
The intensity of the fear and hostility displayed towards the Japanese community were so intent that they were cause for concern for the authorities. The special Standing Committee on Orientals, for example, stated in its report in December that "all the witnesses it had called, whether they were or were not sympathetic toward the Japanese-Canadians, had agreed that the real danger as violence on the part of the white community."
In light of the fear of treason and sabotage and, to a lesser extent, out of concern for the safety of Japanese-Canadians, the government felt great pressure to show some kind of response.
B. FLQ Crisis, October 5-December 3, 1970: The Events and the Threat
In response to grievances against the rest of Canada, and in an effort to convince both Quebecois and Canadians to allow Quebec to separate, the Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ) carried out more than 200 crimes from 1963 to 1970, resulting in a great deal of damage and social disruption and six deaths.[FN] The largest such incident, the bombing of the Montreal Stock Exchange on February 13, 1969, resulted in enormous damage and injured 27 people. FLQ members also carried out thefts of explosives to use in their attacks and bank robberies to finance their operations. By 1970, there were 23 FLQ members in jail, four of them convicted of murder.[FN]
On October 5, 1970, the FLQ kidnapped British Trade Commissioner James Cross and sent the authorities a ransom letter with their demands in exchange for his release. The demands included ransom money, the release of many of the FLQ members who had been detained, and the CBC broadcast of the FLQ Manifesto. Although the government did not agree to any other demands, they did agree to allow the FLQ Manifesto to read over CBC/Radio-Canada Oct. 8, 1970. Some excerpts from the Manifesto:
The Front de Libération du Québec wants total independence for Quebeckers; it wants to see them united in a free society, a society purged for good of its gang of rapacious sharks...
The Front de Libération du Québec is not an aggressive movement, but a response to the aggression organized by high finance through its puppets, the federal and provincial governments...
... we wash our hands of the British parliamentary system ... In the coming year Bourassa is going to get what's coming to him: 100,000 revolutionary workers, armed and organized![FN Manifesto]
On October 10, Pierre Laporte, Minister of Labour and Vice-Premier of Quebec, was kidnapped by another cell of the FLQ. On October 15, FLQ representatives spoke to 1,500 students at the Université de Montréal. The majority of the students voiced support for the FLQ's demands, and organized a rally that night that brought 3,000 students from across Montreal to show their support for the FLQ. At the same time, ten prominent Quebecois public figures, including René Lévesque, leader of the Parti Québecois, Claude Ryan, Editor of Le Devoir, and labour leader Louis Laberge, claimed that it was "urgent that the FLQ demands be met in order that social and political liberty in Quebec can be guaranteed."[FLQ clip]
The Quebec authorities responded by formally requesting help from the federal government. Robert Bourassa, Premier of Quebec, expressed his fear that the crisis did not just involve the danger to the lives of the two men in captivity:
the Quebec Government is convinced that the law, as it stands now, is inadequate to meet this situation satisfactorily.
Under the circumstances, on behalf of the Government of Quebec, I request that emergency powers be provided as soon as possible so that more effective steps may be taken. I request particularly that such powers encompass the authority to apprehend and keep in custody individuals who, the Attorney General of Quebec has valid reasons to believe, are determined to overthrow the government through violence and illegal means ... we are facing a concerted effort to intimidate and overthrow the government and the democratic institutions of this province through planned and systematic illegal action, including insurrection. It is obvious that those participating in this concerted effort completely reject the principle of freedom under the rule of law.
His sentiments were echoed by M. St. Pierre, Director of the police of Montreal, who outlined the practical terms of what kinds of powers were needed, and why:
... the investigation which the police authorities must undertake must necessarily delve into all aspects of the activities of the networks of this seditious movement, and should not be restricted to simply searching for the individuals who perpetrated the odious kidnapping of the two people who are still prisoners - for this would mean failure.
The slowness of procedures and the restraints imposed by the legal methods and mechanisms now at our disposal do not allow us at this time to cope with the situation.
Consequently, I recommend that the executive committee of the city, request that the higher governments give us all the means they think appropriate and useful, so as to allow us to collect and present the proofs needed to protect society from the seditious and insurrectional manoeuvres unleashed by the kidnappings.[FN letters]
