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Dec. 8th, 2006 04:49 am![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
ciroccojMore Civil Liberty Fun!
III. CANADA'S RESPONSES
A. Japanese Internment
1. Powers invoked
The War Measures Act, enacted in 1914, gives the Canadian federal government the right to abrogate various civil liberties during wartime. Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, and at the urging of various groups and individuals from British Columbia, the government decided to consider Japanese Canadians "enemy aliens" and security threats, and invoked the War Measures Act to remove them from the west coast.
The implementation of the War Measures Act first required a proclamation that "...war, invasion, or insurrection, real or apprehended, exists and has existed for any period of time therein stated, and of its continuance, until by the issue of a further proclamation it is declared that the war, invasion or insurrection no longer exists."[FN] The attack on Pearl Harbor and the fact that Canada declared war against Japan two days later, not to mention the fact that Canada was already at war with Japan's allies in Europe, provided the necessary conditions for such a proclamation of war/state of emergency.
Once the proclamation was made, the Governor in Council's powers extended to cover many areas otherwise left to individual liberty or to the provinces, such as:
(a) Censorship and the control and suppression of publications, writings, maps, plans, photographs, communications and means of communication;
(b) Arrest, detention, exclusion and deportation;
(c) Control of the harbours, ports and territorial waters of Canada and the movements of vessels;
(d) Transportation by land, air, or Water and the control of the transport of persons and things;
(e) Trading, exportation, importation, production and manufacture;
(f) Appropriation, control, forfeiture and disposition of property and of the use thereof.[FN WMA Text]
2. Justifications and Excuses
In the days following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the federal government issued a statement expressing confidence that Japanese-Canadians were loyal to Canada, urging calm and discouraging anti-Japanese sentiments. [Sunahara, Ch X] The sentiment in BC was less sanguine; the Vancouver Sun ran an editorial on December 16 warning that "at the slightest evidence of sabotage or lack of cooperation, British Columbia's Japanese should be interned." [Sunahara]
In January of 1942, a conference was held in Ottawa to discuss the "Japanese problem". The conference was attended by various officials, representatives from the armed forces, national security, and a delegation from BC. On the surface it seemed that, to most of the participants, there was no Japanese problem:
The officials led by [Canadian secretary of the Permanent Joint Board of Defence Hugh L.] Keenleyside ... were convinced there was no good reason to intern the Japanese and that to do so would be contrary to Canadian and Allied professions of justice and humanity. It was also pointed, on a more practical level, that harsh treatment meted out in Canada might lead to retaliation by the Japanese against the Canadian prisoners captured in Hong Kong. Taylor, p22
...
Major General Pope, the vice-chief of the General Staff, echoed the view of his chief that "From the army point of view I cannot see that they constitute the slightest menace to national security." Taylor, P22
However, the sentiment from the BC delegation was markedly different. General Pope wrote later that "The BC delegates ... spoke of the Japanese Canadians in the way that the Nazis would have spoken of Jewish-Germans,"[Taylor, p.22] and that one of the politicians told him off the record that many BC leaders had been hoping for years that a war with Japan would provide them with the opportunity to "rid themselves of the Japanese-Canadian economic menace. Taylor, [P. 22]
The resolution at the end of that conference was that nothing should be done about the BC Japanese. Their fishing boats and licenses had been taken away, and that was considered to be enough by the majority of people at the conference. Unfortunately, it was not enough to the people of BC. In the weeks following the conference, the BC delegates kept up the pressure on the Federal government - and on Mackenzie King - to remove all Japanese from the coast.
Not all of the pressure was hostile to the Japanese. For example, David Lewis, CCF National Secretary, wrote that:
Intellectually you would have to divide the CCF position into three: the position against the mishandling of the Japanese and their rights as Canadian citizens – that was Angus MacInnis's [CCF M.P. for Vancouver East] position, and that had the support of the majority of the CCF. The others [in B.C.] were divided into two: the hysterical, which included strangely enough… the leftwing Marxists, and then there were the people who were afraid of the local situation. Sunahara
Finally, after weeks of growing concern and anger from BC, as a way to appease BC voters, Mackenzie King announced on 25 February 1942 that all Japanese would be moved "for reasons of national security," in order to safeguard the defences of the Pacific Coast.[FN]
Keenleyside called it "a cheap and needless capitulation to popular prejudice fanned by political bigotry or ambition or both." Taylor, p24
3. Effect on the individuals targeted
Between 1942 and 1949, as a result of WMA s.3(b), which gave the government extensive powers of "[a]rrest, detention, exclusion and deportation", 20,881 people, roughly 3/4 of them Canadian citizens, were removed from the west coast and interned in prison camps across Canada.
However, the effects of the WMA on the Japanese Canadians did not begin or end with simple internment. The day after the attack on Pearl Harbor, and as permitted by WMA s.3 (c) (which granted the government "[c]ontrol of the harbours, ports and territorial waters of Canada and the movements of vessels), s.3(e), (covering "[t]rading, exportation, importation, production and manufacture"), and s.3(f), (which covered "[a]ppropriation, control, forfeiture and disposition of property and of the use thereof"), 1,200 Japanese fishermen were forced to bring their fishing boats to Vancouver and had their fishing licences revoked, thus losing their livelihoods. The day after that, all Japanese nationals and Japanese-Canadians who had become citizens after 1922 were required to report to the RCMP and sign undertakings as "enemy aliens."[FN Black p. 9-10]. They were henceforth obliged to carry at all times a card naming them enemy aliens, with their photograph and thumbprint, and produce it upon request.[FN Bittersweet passage].
As per WMA s. 3(a), which gave the government control over "[c]ensorship and the control and suppression of publications, writings, maps, plans, photographs, communications and means of communication", Japanese language newspapers were closed down, leaving only one Japanese newspaper running: the English-language New Canadian. As many first-generation Japanese immigrant had serious difficulty with written English, this essentially left them without a means of community expression or communication unless they had second-generation children to read The New Canadian to them.[Black mark, p9]. Japanese language schools, where many immigrants sent their children, were also immediately closed down out of fear that the schools, which used Japanese textbooks, might spread pro-Japan propaganda.
As for the "arrest and detention" of persons allowed by WMA s. (b), merely calling it "internment" does not do justice to the event. The Japanese-Canadians were detained without trials, without redress, and for no reason other than their ancestry. Families were split apart as they arrived at Hastings Park in Vancouver, where the men were housed in one building and the women and children in another while officials tried to figure out more permanent places to send them. Food was scarce, bad, and unhealthy, and the buildings were extremely crowded and stank of the livestock that had previously been housed there. Sanitation was almost non-existent, and many of the internees suffered from food poisoning and dysentery. Eventually many of the men were sent to work camps away from the west coast, while the women and children continued to wait for more permanent camps to be set up for them.
Once they were finally allowed out of Hastings, conditions improved, but not by much. Most married men were allowed to rejoin their families, but single young men were sent to Ontario to work on beet farms while their parents and siblings were sent small villages or abandoned mining towns in interior BC or the prairies. They were all still denied the right to vote or move about freely. At the camps, many were not allowed to work or fish for food. There was not enough money for adequate housing or heating, or sanitary facilities, let alone luxuries such as proper clothing and schooling for the children. Their conditions were so deplorable that citizens of wartime Japan sent aid to Japanese-Canadians in the camps.
As per WMA s.3(f), which granted government control over the "[a]ppropriation, control, forfeiture and disposition of property and of the use thereof", the government seized the property that had been left behind by the internees, including homes, businesses, and personal effects, and auctioned it all off at ludicrously low prices. Most Japanese never got their possessions back, nor did they receive most of the money from the proceeds, as the government used them to pay for the cost of housing them during their years in detention. The economic loss was devastating. In Toronto, for example, Japanese Canadians held property valued at $1.6 million. $1.3 million worth of it was sold for approximately a 40% of its worth ($0.5 million). The owners recouped 40% of the sale price. [FN Sunahara Tables]
Following the cessation of the war, the Japanese Canadians continued to be kept out of BC. They were given the choice of moving somewhere east of the Rockies or returning to Japan. Faced with having to start their lives over again in a country that had treated them as enemies and continued to do so, as many as 4,000 of them went back to Japan, their Canadian citizenship revoked. Many others signed papers claiming they wished to go to Japan, but changed their minds as news of Japan's devastation reached Canada. The orders of deportation were finally revoked, and Japanese Canadians who had left but who wished to come back to Canada were eventually allowed to come back.
Until 1948, they were denied the right to vote. Until 1949, they could not move freely within Canada, and were subjected to various limitations such as denial of fishing or medical licenses. These restrictions were said to be security-based, but they also protected economic interests of white Canadians, to the detriment of the Japanese.[FN, Miki] [SOMEWHERE IN THERE THE ID CARDS HAVE THE WRONG DATE – IT WAS BEFORE THE WAR]
Conclusion
Japanese Canadian National Museum, online: <http://www.jcnm.ca/home.htm>.
B. Pierre Trudeau Invokes the War Measures Act
1. Powers invoked
As during the Japanese crisis, the special powers of the WMA were invoked in order to safeguard the "security, defence, peace, order and well-being of Canada"[FN]. In this case, the significant clauses of the WMA were those that gave the government the power to censure, suppress or control publications; to arrest, detain, exclude or expel individuals; and to take over, control, confiscate or dispose thereof or use any property (respectively, ss.3(a), (b) and (f)). The WMA went into effect on October 16, 1970, and was replaced on November 2 by the Public Order Temporary Measures Act, 1970, which was essentially a specially-tailored version of the WMA that named the FLQ as the specific target of the expanded security powers.
The protection and guarantees extended to Canadians by the Canadian Bill of Rights and other provincial civil rights charters were waved aside while these measures were in effect. These included freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and association, protection from arbitrary detention, and the right to be informed of the reason for arrest and retain counsel without delay. As Prime Minister Trudeau explained, in order to find and deal with the FLQ, "[t]hese organizations, and membership in them, have been declared illegal. The powers [accorded to the authorities] include the right to search and arrest without warrant, to detain suspected persons without the necessity of laying specific charges immediately, and to detain persons without bail."[FN Trudeau speech]
2. Justifications and Excuses: "Just Watch Me"
Perhaps the most oft-quoted sentence of Trudeau's political career occurred during an impromptu interview with CBC reporter Tim Ralfe a few days before he invoked the WMA. In the interview, he explained why he felt it was more important to maintain order than to protect certain rights and freedoms:
Trudeau: You know, I think it is more important to get rid of those who are committing violence against the total society ... there are a lot of bleeding hearts around who just don't like to see people with helmets and guns. All I can say is, go on and bleed, but it is more important to keep law and order in the society than to be worried about weak-kneed people who don't like the looks of ...
Ralfe: At any cost? How far would you go with that? How far would you extend that?
Trudeau: Well, just watch me.
Ralfe: At reducing civil liberties? To what extent?
Trudeau: To what extent?
Ralfe: Well, if you extend this and you say, ok, you're going to do anything to protect them, does this include wire-tapping, reducing other civil liberties in some way?
Trudeau: Yes, I think the society must take every means at its disposal to defend itself against the emergence of a parallel power which defies the elected power in this country and I think that goes to any distance.
Trudeau's speech to the nation three days later, explaining the invocation of the War Measures Act, was a sharp contrast to the interview. Instead of somewhat contemptuous dismissal of "bleeding hearts" who were too "weak-kneed" to accept what was necessary to maintain order, instead of a belligerent "Just watch me," he projected calm and reassurance and conscious awareness of the delicate balance that had to be maintained between securing the safety of Canadians and upholding our democratic ideals. He attempted to reassure Canadians that the measures being taken were only being taken with the utmost reluctance and conscious awareness of their gravity:
I can assure you that the Government is most reluctant to seek such powers, and did so only when it became crystal clear that the situation could not be controlled unless some extraordinary assistance was made available on an urgent basis.
The authority contained in the Act will permit Governments to deal effectively with the nebulous yet dangerous challenge to society represented by the terrorist organizations. The criminal law as it stands is simply not adequate to deal with systematic terrorism.
...
These are strong powers and I find them as distasteful as I am sure do you. They are necessary, however, to permit the police to deal with persons who advocate or promote the violent overthow of our democratic system. In short, I assure you that the Government recognizes its grave responsibilities in interfering in certain cases with civil liberties, and that it remains answerable to the people of Canada for its actions. The Government will revoke this proclamation as soon as possible.
This government is ... acting to maintain the rule of law without which freedom is impossible. It is acting to make clear to kidnappers and revolutionaries and assassins that in this country laws are made and changed by the elected representatives of all Canadians... The government is acting, therefore, to protect your life and your liberty. [PET speech]
While there was widespread support for the measures taken (85% of Canadians felt they were necessary and justified[FN]), not everyone was as tolerant. Indeed, Tommy Douglas, leader of the NDP, said of the measures the "It's like using a sledgehammer to crack a peanut."[FN]
3. Effect on the individuals targeted
The police carried out 1,628 raids within the first five days of the WMA. By the end of the year, 468 people had been arrested and held without bail. Many were held without access to lawyers, and without any outside contact, for days. Eventually 408 people were released without charges being laid; only two people were sentenced.[FN]
Many cases of censorship were recorded, in particular against Canadian university organizations who attempted to express disapproval of the WMA or support for the FLQ, or who attempted to publish the FLQ manifesto. Nevertheless, at least seven different papers did succeed in printing it.
The effect on the collective psyche of Quebec is more difficult to calculate. Many Quebecois, whether supportive of separatism or not, were relieved that the federal government had stepped in and taken control of a volatile situation. Many others, however, felt more alienated than ever by the government's response, in particular its arrest of many influential Quebecois public figures and its suspension of civil rights in the name of maintaining federalism.
It is really freaking cold in the study. I'm wearing a scarf and will soon break out the mittens. Which will probably make typing no fun at all.
III. CANADA'S RESPONSES
A. Japanese Internment
1. Powers invoked
The War Measures Act, enacted in 1914, gives the Canadian federal government the right to abrogate various civil liberties during wartime. Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, and at the urging of various groups and individuals from British Columbia, the government decided to consider Japanese Canadians "enemy aliens" and security threats, and invoked the War Measures Act to remove them from the west coast.
The implementation of the War Measures Act first required a proclamation that "...war, invasion, or insurrection, real or apprehended, exists and has existed for any period of time therein stated, and of its continuance, until by the issue of a further proclamation it is declared that the war, invasion or insurrection no longer exists."[FN] The attack on Pearl Harbor and the fact that Canada declared war against Japan two days later, not to mention the fact that Canada was already at war with Japan's allies in Europe, provided the necessary conditions for such a proclamation of war/state of emergency.
Once the proclamation was made, the Governor in Council's powers extended to cover many areas otherwise left to individual liberty or to the provinces, such as:
(a) Censorship and the control and suppression of publications, writings, maps, plans, photographs, communications and means of communication;
(b) Arrest, detention, exclusion and deportation;
(c) Control of the harbours, ports and territorial waters of Canada and the movements of vessels;
(d) Transportation by land, air, or Water and the control of the transport of persons and things;
(e) Trading, exportation, importation, production and manufacture;
(f) Appropriation, control, forfeiture and disposition of property and of the use thereof.[FN WMA Text]
2. Justifications and Excuses
In the days following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the federal government issued a statement expressing confidence that Japanese-Canadians were loyal to Canada, urging calm and discouraging anti-Japanese sentiments. [Sunahara, Ch X] The sentiment in BC was less sanguine; the Vancouver Sun ran an editorial on December 16 warning that "at the slightest evidence of sabotage or lack of cooperation, British Columbia's Japanese should be interned." [Sunahara]
In January of 1942, a conference was held in Ottawa to discuss the "Japanese problem". The conference was attended by various officials, representatives from the armed forces, national security, and a delegation from BC. On the surface it seemed that, to most of the participants, there was no Japanese problem:
The officials led by [Canadian secretary of the Permanent Joint Board of Defence Hugh L.] Keenleyside ... were convinced there was no good reason to intern the Japanese and that to do so would be contrary to Canadian and Allied professions of justice and humanity. It was also pointed, on a more practical level, that harsh treatment meted out in Canada might lead to retaliation by the Japanese against the Canadian prisoners captured in Hong Kong. Taylor, p22
...
Major General Pope, the vice-chief of the General Staff, echoed the view of his chief that "From the army point of view I cannot see that they constitute the slightest menace to national security." Taylor, P22
However, the sentiment from the BC delegation was markedly different. General Pope wrote later that "The BC delegates ... spoke of the Japanese Canadians in the way that the Nazis would have spoken of Jewish-Germans,"[Taylor, p.22] and that one of the politicians told him off the record that many BC leaders had been hoping for years that a war with Japan would provide them with the opportunity to "rid themselves of the Japanese-Canadian economic menace. Taylor, [P. 22]
The resolution at the end of that conference was that nothing should be done about the BC Japanese. Their fishing boats and licenses had been taken away, and that was considered to be enough by the majority of people at the conference. Unfortunately, it was not enough to the people of BC. In the weeks following the conference, the BC delegates kept up the pressure on the Federal government - and on Mackenzie King - to remove all Japanese from the coast.
Not all of the pressure was hostile to the Japanese. For example, David Lewis, CCF National Secretary, wrote that:
Intellectually you would have to divide the CCF position into three: the position against the mishandling of the Japanese and their rights as Canadian citizens – that was Angus MacInnis's [CCF M.P. for Vancouver East] position, and that had the support of the majority of the CCF. The others [in B.C.] were divided into two: the hysterical, which included strangely enough… the leftwing Marxists, and then there were the people who were afraid of the local situation. Sunahara
Finally, after weeks of growing concern and anger from BC, as a way to appease BC voters, Mackenzie King announced on 25 February 1942 that all Japanese would be moved "for reasons of national security," in order to safeguard the defences of the Pacific Coast.[FN]
Keenleyside called it "a cheap and needless capitulation to popular prejudice fanned by political bigotry or ambition or both." Taylor, p24
3. Effect on the individuals targeted
Between 1942 and 1949, as a result of WMA s.3(b), which gave the government extensive powers of "[a]rrest, detention, exclusion and deportation", 20,881 people, roughly 3/4 of them Canadian citizens, were removed from the west coast and interned in prison camps across Canada.
However, the effects of the WMA on the Japanese Canadians did not begin or end with simple internment. The day after the attack on Pearl Harbor, and as permitted by WMA s.3 (c) (which granted the government "[c]ontrol of the harbours, ports and territorial waters of Canada and the movements of vessels), s.3(e), (covering "[t]rading, exportation, importation, production and manufacture"), and s.3(f), (which covered "[a]ppropriation, control, forfeiture and disposition of property and of the use thereof"), 1,200 Japanese fishermen were forced to bring their fishing boats to Vancouver and had their fishing licences revoked, thus losing their livelihoods. The day after that, all Japanese nationals and Japanese-Canadians who had become citizens after 1922 were required to report to the RCMP and sign undertakings as "enemy aliens."[FN Black p. 9-10]. They were henceforth obliged to carry at all times a card naming them enemy aliens, with their photograph and thumbprint, and produce it upon request.[FN Bittersweet passage].
As per WMA s. 3(a), which gave the government control over "[c]ensorship and the control and suppression of publications, writings, maps, plans, photographs, communications and means of communication", Japanese language newspapers were closed down, leaving only one Japanese newspaper running: the English-language New Canadian. As many first-generation Japanese immigrant had serious difficulty with written English, this essentially left them without a means of community expression or communication unless they had second-generation children to read The New Canadian to them.[Black mark, p9]. Japanese language schools, where many immigrants sent their children, were also immediately closed down out of fear that the schools, which used Japanese textbooks, might spread pro-Japan propaganda.
As for the "arrest and detention" of persons allowed by WMA s. (b), merely calling it "internment" does not do justice to the event. The Japanese-Canadians were detained without trials, without redress, and for no reason other than their ancestry. Families were split apart as they arrived at Hastings Park in Vancouver, where the men were housed in one building and the women and children in another while officials tried to figure out more permanent places to send them. Food was scarce, bad, and unhealthy, and the buildings were extremely crowded and stank of the livestock that had previously been housed there. Sanitation was almost non-existent, and many of the internees suffered from food poisoning and dysentery. Eventually many of the men were sent to work camps away from the west coast, while the women and children continued to wait for more permanent camps to be set up for them.
Once they were finally allowed out of Hastings, conditions improved, but not by much. Most married men were allowed to rejoin their families, but single young men were sent to Ontario to work on beet farms while their parents and siblings were sent small villages or abandoned mining towns in interior BC or the prairies. They were all still denied the right to vote or move about freely. At the camps, many were not allowed to work or fish for food. There was not enough money for adequate housing or heating, or sanitary facilities, let alone luxuries such as proper clothing and schooling for the children. Their conditions were so deplorable that citizens of wartime Japan sent aid to Japanese-Canadians in the camps.
As per WMA s.3(f), which granted government control over the "[a]ppropriation, control, forfeiture and disposition of property and of the use thereof", the government seized the property that had been left behind by the internees, including homes, businesses, and personal effects, and auctioned it all off at ludicrously low prices. Most Japanese never got their possessions back, nor did they receive most of the money from the proceeds, as the government used them to pay for the cost of housing them during their years in detention. The economic loss was devastating. In Toronto, for example, Japanese Canadians held property valued at $1.6 million. $1.3 million worth of it was sold for approximately a 40% of its worth ($0.5 million). The owners recouped 40% of the sale price. [FN Sunahara Tables]
Following the cessation of the war, the Japanese Canadians continued to be kept out of BC. They were given the choice of moving somewhere east of the Rockies or returning to Japan. Faced with having to start their lives over again in a country that had treated them as enemies and continued to do so, as many as 4,000 of them went back to Japan, their Canadian citizenship revoked. Many others signed papers claiming they wished to go to Japan, but changed their minds as news of Japan's devastation reached Canada. The orders of deportation were finally revoked, and Japanese Canadians who had left but who wished to come back to Canada were eventually allowed to come back.
Until 1948, they were denied the right to vote. Until 1949, they could not move freely within Canada, and were subjected to various limitations such as denial of fishing or medical licenses. These restrictions were said to be security-based, but they also protected economic interests of white Canadians, to the detriment of the Japanese.[FN, Miki] [SOMEWHERE IN THERE THE ID CARDS HAVE THE WRONG DATE – IT WAS BEFORE THE WAR]
Conclusion
Japanese Canadian National Museum, online: <http://www.jcnm.ca/home.htm>.
B. Pierre Trudeau Invokes the War Measures Act
1. Powers invoked
As during the Japanese crisis, the special powers of the WMA were invoked in order to safeguard the "security, defence, peace, order and well-being of Canada"[FN]. In this case, the significant clauses of the WMA were those that gave the government the power to censure, suppress or control publications; to arrest, detain, exclude or expel individuals; and to take over, control, confiscate or dispose thereof or use any property (respectively, ss.3(a), (b) and (f)). The WMA went into effect on October 16, 1970, and was replaced on November 2 by the Public Order Temporary Measures Act, 1970, which was essentially a specially-tailored version of the WMA that named the FLQ as the specific target of the expanded security powers.
The protection and guarantees extended to Canadians by the Canadian Bill of Rights and other provincial civil rights charters were waved aside while these measures were in effect. These included freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and association, protection from arbitrary detention, and the right to be informed of the reason for arrest and retain counsel without delay. As Prime Minister Trudeau explained, in order to find and deal with the FLQ, "[t]hese organizations, and membership in them, have been declared illegal. The powers [accorded to the authorities] include the right to search and arrest without warrant, to detain suspected persons without the necessity of laying specific charges immediately, and to detain persons without bail."[FN Trudeau speech]
2. Justifications and Excuses: "Just Watch Me"
Perhaps the most oft-quoted sentence of Trudeau's political career occurred during an impromptu interview with CBC reporter Tim Ralfe a few days before he invoked the WMA. In the interview, he explained why he felt it was more important to maintain order than to protect certain rights and freedoms:
Trudeau: You know, I think it is more important to get rid of those who are committing violence against the total society ... there are a lot of bleeding hearts around who just don't like to see people with helmets and guns. All I can say is, go on and bleed, but it is more important to keep law and order in the society than to be worried about weak-kneed people who don't like the looks of ...
Ralfe: At any cost? How far would you go with that? How far would you extend that?
Trudeau: Well, just watch me.
Ralfe: At reducing civil liberties? To what extent?
Trudeau: To what extent?
Ralfe: Well, if you extend this and you say, ok, you're going to do anything to protect them, does this include wire-tapping, reducing other civil liberties in some way?
Trudeau: Yes, I think the society must take every means at its disposal to defend itself against the emergence of a parallel power which defies the elected power in this country and I think that goes to any distance.
Trudeau's speech to the nation three days later, explaining the invocation of the War Measures Act, was a sharp contrast to the interview. Instead of somewhat contemptuous dismissal of "bleeding hearts" who were too "weak-kneed" to accept what was necessary to maintain order, instead of a belligerent "Just watch me," he projected calm and reassurance and conscious awareness of the delicate balance that had to be maintained between securing the safety of Canadians and upholding our democratic ideals. He attempted to reassure Canadians that the measures being taken were only being taken with the utmost reluctance and conscious awareness of their gravity:
I can assure you that the Government is most reluctant to seek such powers, and did so only when it became crystal clear that the situation could not be controlled unless some extraordinary assistance was made available on an urgent basis.
The authority contained in the Act will permit Governments to deal effectively with the nebulous yet dangerous challenge to society represented by the terrorist organizations. The criminal law as it stands is simply not adequate to deal with systematic terrorism.
...
These are strong powers and I find them as distasteful as I am sure do you. They are necessary, however, to permit the police to deal with persons who advocate or promote the violent overthow of our democratic system. In short, I assure you that the Government recognizes its grave responsibilities in interfering in certain cases with civil liberties, and that it remains answerable to the people of Canada for its actions. The Government will revoke this proclamation as soon as possible.
This government is ... acting to maintain the rule of law without which freedom is impossible. It is acting to make clear to kidnappers and revolutionaries and assassins that in this country laws are made and changed by the elected representatives of all Canadians... The government is acting, therefore, to protect your life and your liberty. [PET speech]
While there was widespread support for the measures taken (85% of Canadians felt they were necessary and justified[FN]), not everyone was as tolerant. Indeed, Tommy Douglas, leader of the NDP, said of the measures the "It's like using a sledgehammer to crack a peanut."[FN]
3. Effect on the individuals targeted
The police carried out 1,628 raids within the first five days of the WMA. By the end of the year, 468 people had been arrested and held without bail. Many were held without access to lawyers, and without any outside contact, for days. Eventually 408 people were released without charges being laid; only two people were sentenced.[FN]
Many cases of censorship were recorded, in particular against Canadian university organizations who attempted to express disapproval of the WMA or support for the FLQ, or who attempted to publish the FLQ manifesto. Nevertheless, at least seven different papers did succeed in printing it.
The effect on the collective psyche of Quebec is more difficult to calculate. Many Quebecois, whether supportive of separatism or not, were relieved that the federal government had stepped in and taken control of a volatile situation. Many others, however, felt more alienated than ever by the government's response, in particular its arrest of many influential Quebecois public figures and its suspension of civil rights in the name of maintaining federalism.
It is really freaking cold in the study. I'm wearing a scarf and will soon break out the mittens. Which will probably make typing no fun at all.
![[identity profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/openid.png){kind=small}
no subject
Date: 2006-12-09 04:17 am (UTC)